

328

14

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

~~SECRET~~

46-48

Action F780011-0597

Control:

18024

Rec'd:

OCTOBER 25, 1962

6:17 AM

FE
Info

FROM: DJAKARTA

SS

TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 742, OCTOBER 25, 5 PM

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ACTION DEPARTMENT 742, INFORMATION CINCPAC PRIORITY 2,
MOSCOW PRIORITY 11.

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POLICY

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FOLLOWING ARE PRINCIPAL POINTS REPORTED BY
INDIAN AMBASSADOR PANT AS HAVING BEEN MADE BY
SOV AMB MIKHAILOV DURING CONVERSATION OCT 25:

1. PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S QUARANTINE HAD PRECIPITATED "VERY SERIOUS SITUATION" AND PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV WAS "VERY DISAPPOINTED" IN PRESIDENT KENNEDY, HAVING PREVIOUSLY BELIEVED THAT THERE WAS OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE WITH HIM.
2. IF US SANK SOV SHIPS, SOVS WOULD SINK US SHIPS, BUT SOVS WOULD NOT (REPEAT NOT) DROP FIRST NUCLEAR BOMB.
3. US NOT WHOLE-HEARTEDLY SUPPORTED BY ALLIES.
DIFFERENCE OF OPINION NOTICEABLE ON PART OF BRITISH WHO, WHILE THEY SAID THEY WOULD SUPPORT US, NEVERTHELESS DID NOT AGREE TO SUPPORT WAR. SIMILAR ATTITUDE PREVAILED AMONG EUROPEAN POWERS WITH ADDITIONAL FACT THAT THEY REGARDED IT AS JOKE THAT US SHOULD FEAR ATTACK FROM LITTLE CUBA. EVEN IN "CAPITALIST JAPAN" MIKHAILOV

ADDED, THERE

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-2- 742, OCTOBER 25, 5 PM FROM JAKARTA

ADDED, THERE WERE DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST US ACTION.

4. IN RESPONSE TO INQUIRY CONCERNING PROPOSAL OF U THANT WHICH CHARGE HAD NOT SEEN, MIKHAILOV TOLD PANT THAT SOVS WILLING TO NEGOTIATE. MIKHAILOV SAID SOVS WOULD HOLD OFF SHIPS DURING TALKS. QUESTION OF REMOVAL OF ROCKET BASES COULD BE NEGOTIATED, PANT QUOTED MIKHAILOV AS SAYING.

PANT SUMMARIZED CONVERSATION BY SAYING HIS OVER-ALL IMPRESSION WAS SOVS WOULD LIKE TO NEGOTIATE OVER CUBA, WOULD NOT LAUNCH NUCLEAR WARFARE, BUT IN EVENT OF INCIDENTS WOULD INSIST UPON SOME FORM OF RETALIATION AS FACE-SAVING MEASURE.

PANT ALSO SAW CUBAN CHARGE, WHO TOLD HIM "CUBA WOULD NEVER ACCEPT" ANY NEGOTIATION WHICH INVOLVED TURNING BACK SOV SHIPS SINCE CUBA'S ENTIRE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM AND SUGAR EXPORTS DEPENDED ON SOV TRAFFIC. CUBAN CHARGE SAID PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE PRODUCED BY US WAS FABRICATED IN US, WAS NOT PRODUCT OF ANY PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN CUBA.

INDIAN AMBASSADOR SAID SOV AMBASSADOR EXTREMELY ACTIVE IN CONTACTING INDONESIAN JOURNALISTS, POLITICAL LEADERS. CLAIMED TO HAVE SUPPORT OF MOST.

HENDERSON

SJR

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REVIEWED by *Ym* DATE 5/9/88
(RELEASE) (DECLASSIFY
(EXCISE) (DECLASSIFY in PART
(DENY) (Non-responsive info.
FOI, EO or PA exemptions (b) (1)

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MOSCOW PRIORITY 11.

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(b) (1) (g) (9)

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[REDACTED]

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